Abstract. Goldreich-Krawczyk (Siam J of Comp'96) showed that only languages in BPP have constant-round public-coin black-box zero-knowledge protocols. We extend their lower bound to "fully black-box" privatecoin protocols based on one-way functions. More precisely, we show that only languages in BPP Sam -where Sam is a "collision-finding" oracle in analogy with Simon (Eurocrypt'98) and Haitner et. al (FOCS'07)-can have constant-round fully black-box zero-knowledge proofs; the same holds for constant-round fully black-box zero-knowledge arguments with sublinear verifier communication complexity. We also establish nearlinear lower bounds on the round complexity of fully black-box concurrent zero-knowledge proofs (or arguments with sublinear verifier communication) for languages outside BPP Sam . The technique used to establish these results is a transformation from private-coin protocols into Sam-relativized public-coin protocols; for the case of fully black-box protocols based on one-way functions, this transformation preserves zero knowledge, round complexity and communication complexity.
Introduction
Roughly speaking, interactive proofs, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [9] and Babai and Moran [1] ), are protocols that allow one party Pcalled the Prover (or Merlin)-to convince a computationally-bounded party V -called the Verifier (or Arthur)-of the validity of some statement x ∈ L. While, the notion of interactive proofs introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff considers arbitrary probability polynomial time verifiers, the notion introduced by Babai and Moran, called Arthur-Merlin games considers verifiers that only send truly random messages; such proof systems are also called public coin. Soon after their introduction, a surprisingly result by Goldwasser and Sipser [11] showed that the two notions in fact are equivalent in their expressive power: Any private coin protocol P, V for a language L can be transformed into a public-coin P , V for L with the same round-complexity. Their result has played an important role in subsequent complexity-theoretic work. However, from a cryptographic perspective, the transformation is somewhat unsatisfactory as it does not preserve the efficiency of the prover-and can thus not be applied to "computationally-sound" protocols (a.k.a. arguments)-or properties such as zero-knowledge-the principal notion introduced in [9] . By a result of Vadhan [26] , any transformation that uses the original private-coin protocol P, V as a black-box, in fact, must require the prover to run in super-polynomial time.
In this work, we provide different and "robust" transformations from privatecoin protocols to public-coin protocols. Our transformations preserve zero-knowledge, computational and communication complexity, but instead require the prover and the verifier to have oracle access to a certain "collision-finding" oracle [25, 13] , denoted Sam. Our transformation is black-box and thus by Vadhan's results we are required to use a super-polynomial time oracle. Nevertheless, the Sam oracle is not "too" powerful; in particular, as shown by Haitner, Hoch, Reingold and Segev [13] it cannot be used to invert one-way functions. Therefore, if the security properties (namely, zero-knowledge and computational soundness) of the private-coin protocol are based on the hardness of inverting one-way functions (or even trapdoor permutations), we can use our transformation to extended lower bounds for public-coin protocols to private-coin protocols.
More precisely, Goldreich and Krawczyk [8] showed that only languages in BPP can have constant-round public-coin black-box zero-knowledge protocols. Recently, Pass, Tseng and Wikström [21] extended this results to include all (even super-constant round) black-box zero-knowledge protocols that remain secure under concurrent (or even parallel) composition (a.k.a concurrent zeroknowledge protocols). Combining our transformation with these results, we obtain new lower bounds for fully black-box constructions of general, potentially private-coin, black-box zero-knowledge protocols based on the existence of oneway permutations.
Theorem 1 (Lower Bounds for Fully Black-Box Zero KnowledgeInformally stated). Let P, V be a fully black-box construction of a zeroknowledge proof (or argument) for the language L from one-way permutations. Then, L ∈ BPP Sam if any of the following hold:
1. P, V is an O(1)-round proof. 2. P, V is an O(1)-round argument with o(n) verifier communication complexity.
P, V is an o(
In Section 3, we discuss the complexity of BPP Sam . We observe that the class SZK, of languages having statistical zero-knowledge proofs, is contained in BPP Sam . This should not be surprising as Ong and Vadhan provide unconditional constructions of constant-round black-box zero-knowledge proofs for languages in SZK [19] . By extending the result of [13] we also observe that BPP Sam does not "generically" decide all NP languages, and seems thus like an interesting and natural complexity class in its own right.
We finally mention that the techniques used in our transformation are interesting in their own right. First, it directly follows that that there is no fully black-box construction of a one-way function, that compresses its input by more than a constant factor, from one-way permutations. Next, as pointed out to us by Haitner, it would seem that by our techniques, the black-box lower bounds from [14] can be extended also to honest-but-curious protocols; see the proof of Lemma 2 for more details.
Preliminaries and Definitions
We assume familiarity with the basic notions of an Interactive Turing Machine (ITM for brevity) and a protocol (in essence a pair of ITMs). We denote by PPT the class of probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines and n.u.PPT , the class of non-uniform PPT machines. We denote by M
• an oracle machine; we sometimes drop • when it is clear from the context. n and Π denote the set of all permutations {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * (obtained by choosing a π n from Π n for every n).
Fully Black-Box Constructions
A construction of a cryptographic primitive p from a primitive q is said to be fully black-box if both the implementation and the proof of correctness are black-box.
(See [24] for more details on black-box constructions and reductions.) Here, we focus on fully black-box constructions from one-way permutations. For simplicity, we show our results only for one-way permutations, but analogous to [13] , our results extend to trapdoor permutations as well. We proceed to define fully black-box constructions of arguments and zero-knowledge.
Definition 1 (Fully black-box interactive arguments) Let P • , V • be an interactive argument for a language L ⊆ {0, 1}
* . We say that P • , V
• is a fully black-box construction from one-way permutations, if there exists a PPT machine A
• , and a polynomial q(·) such that for every permutation π = {π n } ∞ n=1 , malicious prover P * • , sequence {x n } ∞ n=1 where x n ∈L ∩ {0, 1} n and polynomial
for infinitely many n, where the probability is taken uniformly over y ∈ {0, 1} n (and over all the internal coin tosses of A).
Definition 2 (Fully black-box computational zero-knowledge) Let P
• , V
• be an interactive proof (or argument) system for a language L. We say that
• is a fully black-box construction of a computational zero-knowledge proof (or argument) from one-way permutations, if there exists an expected PPT simulator S
• , a PPT machine A • , and a polynomial q(·) such that for every
n , z n ∈ {0, 1} * and polynomial p(·), if for infinitely many n, D distinguishes S π,V * π r (xn,zn) (x n ) and P π , V * π r (z n ) (x n ) with probability at least
in an interaction between P π and V * π
for infinitely many values of n, where the probability is taken uniformly over y ∈ {0, 1} n (and over all the internal coin tosses of A).
Remark 1. Note that in Definition 2, the simulator S unconditionally runs in expected polynomial time. One can consider a weaker definition where A is required to invert π when the expected running time of S exceeds polynomial time. For simplicity (and due to the fact that all known black-box zero-knowledge proofs satisfy this property), we consider the stronger definition, but our results extend also to the weaker definition.
A fully black-box construction of a computational zero-knowledge arguments refers to a construction that is a fully black-box construction in the argument sense and the zero-knowledge sense.
The Collision Finding Class
Our transformation makes use of a "collision finding" oracle. Such an oracle was introduced by Simon [25] . In this work, we require a slightly stronger oracle that finds "collisions" in interactive protocols. Such an oracle-referred to as Samwas recently introduced by Haitner, Hoch, Reingold and Segev [13] . The oracle comes with a permutation π and a parameter d; the depth parameter d denotes the number of rounds in the protocol on which it finds collisions. We denote the oracle by Sam 
Otherwise, it outputs ⊥. We remark that the role of r in the query is to obtain new and independent samples for each r and allow a verifier to obtain the same sample query by querying on the same r.
Our above description of the Sam π d(n) -oracle is a stateful instantiation of the oracle defined in [13] . Just as in [13] , for our results, we need the oracle to be stateless; [13] specify how to modify the oracle to achieve this (using "signatures"); we omit the details. It was shown by Haitner et. al that random permutations are hard to invert for polynomial time machines that query Sam oracle upto depth o( n log n ).
Theorem 2 ([13]). For every PPT machine A
• , there exists a negligible func-
where the probability is taken uniformly over the randomness of Sam
Looking ahead, in Section 4.2, we show that this result is optimal w.r.t the depth: Sam π n log n can be used to invert π.
The complexity class CF d
We introduce a new complexity classes CF d , which we call the "collision-finding class", that we use as part of our characterization of zero-knowledge protocols. where both the probabilities are taken uniformly over the random coins of M , the randomness of Sam and a random permutation π.
The complexity class CF d seems to be interesting classes that lies between P and NP. Below we state some properties about this class. The formal proofs of these statements are postponed to the full version.
For every
log n can invert any one-way function with output length l(n) on length n inputs (Theorem 3 in Section 4.2)
We leave a fuller exploration of the collision-finding class for future work. Note that, by property (4), if NP ⊆ CF poly(n) , we have a "natural" complexity class that can inverts all one-way functions but not decide NP.
We mention that a somewhat weaker (and perhaps even more natural) definition of the collision-finding class-let us denote it CF' d -is defined identically, but without giving M , or Sam, access to a random permutation π. That is, in our notation
where ⊥ is the all zero oracle. Clearly CF' d ⊆ CF d , but all the properties above continue to hold also for CF'.
A very recent work by Haitner, Mahmoody-Ghidary and Xiao [16] takes a step towards showing that CF' O(1) does not contain NP; they show that if the deciding machine M only makes a constant number of adaptive queries to Sam, then the language it decides is in coAM.
From Private Coins to Public Coins
In this section, we provide our transformation from private-coin to public-coin protocols. We provide two transformations: The first transformation-or weak duality-converts any private coin zero-knowledge proof into a public-coin zeroknowledge proof in the Sam-hybrid model, where the prover, verifier and simulator have oracle access to Sam. The second transformation-or strong duality-converts any private coin zero-knowledge argument with sublinear verifier communication complexity into a public coin zero-knowledge argument in the Sam-hybrid model. While the first transformation is oracle efficient (the maximum depth it queries Sam is "small"), the second transformation is computationally efficient (the soundness reduction is polynomial-time) and thus can be applied to arguments.
Our transformations consider zero-knowledge proofs and arguments in an oracle world. Let O be a set of oracles O : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * .
Definition 4 (O-relativized Interactive Proofs)
A pair of interactive machines
• is polynomial-time and the following two conditions hold :
There is a negligible function ν(·), such that for every n,
where the probability is taken over all the internal coin tosses of P , V and uniformly chosen O ∈ O. -Soundness: For every machine B
• , there exists a negligible function ν(·), such that, for every x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1} n ,
where the probability is taken over all the internal coin tosses of V and uniformly chosen O ∈ O.
If the soundness holds only against n.u.PPT B, then P, V is called an Orelativized interactive argument system.
• be an O-relativized interactive proof (argument) system for the language L ∈ N P with the witness relation R L . We say that P
• , V * • is O-relativized computational black-box ZK, if there exists a probabilistic expected polynomial time oracle machine S
• such that for every PPT machine V * • , and PPT distinguisher D • , there exists a negligible function ν(·), such that for all n, x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1} n , z ∈ {0, 1} * ,
• be a d-round fully black-box zeroknowledge proof for a language L from one-way permutations with verifier communication complexity c(n) and prover communication complexity p(n). Then, there exists a d-round public-coin protocol P
with the verifier communication complexity O(dc(n)) and prover communication complexity p(n) that is (π, Sam . Using that, it samples a random message q for V π that is "consistent" with the interaction with P π ; this is made possible using Sam π d . Next, it q feeds internally to P π . Upon receiving a message a from P π , P Let P π , V π be a d-round protocol with oracle access to the a permutations π. Each communication round consists of a message sent from the verifier to the prover followed by a message sent from the prover to the verifier. Without loss of generality, we assume that the verifier sends the first message and the prover sends the last message. Also, the verifier outputs its view at the end of the protocol.
1. Common Input: Statement x ∈ L, security parameter n.
Private Input:
The statement x, for P π and auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1} * for V π .
and obtains as response (transi−1 ::
qi, ri). b P runs P π (transi−1 :: qi) and obtains its response ai. Set transi = transi−1 :: qi :: ai. π that is consistent with the partial conversation and obtains V π 's next message by running V π on that tape. Thus, the only extra knowledge that P possesses in each round is the random tape sampled and (an unbounded) P π can obtain these samples too. A formal description of the transformation is provided in Figure 1 . We now proceed to prove correctness. Proof: We show that, for every permutation π, the probability that V accepts is identical to the probability V π accepts in an interaction with P (where the probability is over Sam π d ). The completeness of P , V then follows from the completeness of P
Sub-Claim 1 For every x, z ∈ {0, 1} * , π ∈ Π the following distributions are identical:
where the distributions are generated by the internal coin tosses of P, V, V and Sam 
Internally incorporate
Otherwise, compute b P * 's next message on transcript transi−1 :: qi. Let it be ai. Set transi = transi−1 :: qi :: ai. Proof: We analyze the abort probability by identifying three bad events for each round and bound their probabilities separately. Then, using an union bound over the bad events for each round, we conclude that the probability of aborting is at most . Therefore, the probability that all 2 L i 3 trials fails is at most
If the bad events do not occur in round i, then the message m is a "likely" message and some trial succeeds, which implies that P * Sam Proof: Recall that, in every round P * Sam π d samples public-coin messages a fixed number of times and aborts if none of them correspond to the private-coin message received externally from V π . We observe that, the process that decides whether the random coins sampled by P * Sam , and hence the probability that the internal emulation leads to a successful interaction is identical to the probability that P * Sam π d succeeds in a real interaction. Recall that the acceptance condition in the internal emulation is decided by reconstructing a P π , V π transcript, sampling a fresh random tape consistent with the entire transcript and running V π on that tape to obtain the verdict. By our construction, the transcript of the internal emulation with P * Sam π d is identical to the transcript between P * Sam π d and the external V π . However, the random coins of the external V π might not be the same as the ones sampled internally. Nevertheless, using the same proof as in Sub-Claim 1, it follows that conditioned on any complete transcript, the probability that the external verifier V π and the internally emulated V
Remark 2. Note that in proof of Claim 2 we provide an algorithmic description of the cheating prover P * Sam π d although we only need to contradict "unconditional soundness". This algortihm will be useful in proving the strong duality lemma (see Lemma 2) where consider also computationally-sound protocols. li where p m is the conditional probability that V π sent m in round i given trans i−1 . Therefore, the total expected running time of P * Sam
L where L is the length of the longest message that V sends. If either the length of a message or the number of rounds is super-logarithmic, then the cheating prover P * does not run in polynomial time. In the strong duality lemma, we show how to overcome this problem, as long as the verifier communication complexity is sublinear; this, however, requires querying Sam on larger depths.
Simulation: Let S π be the simulator for P π , V π . We construct a simulator S 
* such that for infinitely many n, D 
log n ), then no PPT machine with oracle access to Sam π d can invert a random one-way permutation π with more than negligible probability. Therefore, we arrive at a contradiction. This establishes that P , V is a (π, Sam π d )-relativized black-box zero-knowledge proof.
Strong Duality Lemma
Lemma 2 (Strong Duality). Let P
• be a d-round fully black-box zeroknowledge argument for a language L from one-way permutations with verifier communication complexity c(n) and prover communication complexity p(n). Then, there exists a d-round public-coin protocol P Proof: We modify the construction and proof from the previous lemma to obtain this lemma. From Remark 3, we know that the running time of P * , is d2 L where L is the length of the longest V -message. In order to use the previous construction and obtain an efficient P * , we need the length of every verifier message to be logarithmic. Alternatively, if we split every message into segments of length log n bits and use the random tape sampled by Sam to generate one segment of the verifier message at a time, this also makes the running time of P * polynomial. However, now, we need only to ensure the verifier's communication complexity is o(n) (as this guarantees that the maximum depth is o( n log n )). We note that the idea of splitting messages into segments of log n bits was used in [14] but their use of this technique is not sufficient for our application. More precisely, in [14] it is only shown how Sam can be used to generate a new random tape assuming that the original random tape was also generated using the random oracle. In our application, we need to be able to find a random tape for the "external" verifier. (As observed by Haitner in a personal communication, it would seem that by using our techniques (from Lemma 1) the results of [14] could be extended to rule-out also constructions that are secure with respect to only honest-but-curious players.)
We describe the procedure for generating a verifier message using Sam and the rest of the proof follows identically by plugging in this procedure wherever V π 's message is required to be generated. Without loss of generality, we assume that V π 's message in the i th round is a multiple of log n, say k log n. We describe how to sample the i th round message given trans i−1 , the partial transcript for the first i − 1 rounds and a random string s i . We first split s i into k equal parts, s log n where c(n) is the total verifier communication complexity. Since, c(n) ∈ o(n), the maximum depth of a Sam query is o( n log n ). Completeness, Soundness and Zero-Knowledge: The proof of completeness follows exactly as before. As show for the weak-duality, we prove that if there exists a cheating prover P * for P , V that succeeds with probability p, there is a prover P * with oracle access to Sam log n 2 log n = nc(n) log n which is polynomial since c(n) ∈ o(n). Therefore, there exists a PPT prover P * with oracle access to Sam π o( n log n ) that cheats with probability 
n , polynomial p such that P * succeeds in convincing on V on x n with probability 1 p(n) over a random permutation π for infinitely many n. Applying the Borel-Cantelli lemma, we again have that with measure 1 over permutations π, P * cheats for infinitely many n. Using the fully black-box property, we have that for measure 1 over permutations π, there exists an adversary A that inverts π (and hence, for a random π); this violates Theorem 2 and we arrive at a contradiction. This completes the proof of soundness. To prove zero-knowledge, we use the same simulator from the weak duality, with the exception that it treats the verifier messages in log n-bit segments. The rest of the proof follows as before.
We mention that the proof of the strong duality transformation shows that Theorem 2 (due to [13] ) is optimal.
Theorem 3. Let f
• be a function that on inputs of length n has output length l(n). Then, for any π, there exists an oracle PPT machine
Proof: First, we construct a 1-round protocol P • , V
• for the empty language as follows: On input 1 n , V π computes y = f π (r), where r is its random tape and sends y to P π . P π sends a string x to V π . V π accepts if f π (x ) = y. Next, we apply the strong-duality transformation to the protocol P
• and obtain P , V .
In P , V , P / log n 's response, and can just forward r directly to V Sam π l(n)/ log n . Therefore, there is a cheating prover for P , V , that succeeds with probability 1. From the proof of soundness of the strong duality lemma, we know how to construct a cheating prover P * Sam π l(n)/ log n that convinces V π with probability at least 1 2 . This means that P * Sam π l(n)/ log n inverts f π with probability at least 1 2 . The maximum depth of a query by P * Sam
We call a function compressing if it on inputs of length n has output length o(n).
Corollary 1 There exists no fully black-box construction of a compressing oneway function from one-way permutations.
Proof: From Theorem 3, we have an adversary that inverts f π with oracle access to Sam π o( n log n ) . By the fully black-box property, we have an adversary A with oracle access to Sam π o( n log n ) that inverts π. Since this holds for every π, we arrive at a contradiction to Theorem 2.
Black-box Lower Bounds for Zero Knowledge
All our black-box lower bounds follow by combining the weak or strong duality lemma with known lower bounds for public-coin protocols.
Lower Bounds Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Arguments
Goldreich-Krawczyk [8] show that only languages L in BPP have black-box constant-round public-coin zero-knowledge proofs. We remark that the proof of GK uses the simulator as a black-box to decide the language L, and relativizes. We therefore have:
• be a O-relativized constant-round public-coin zero-knowledge proof for a language L with a black-box simulator S. Then, there exists a PPT machine M
• , such that M
O decides L with probability 2 3 when the probability is taken over a uniformly chosen O ∈ O.
Combining this theorem with the weak-duality lemma, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2 (Constant-round Zero-Knowledge Proofs) For any constant d, only languages L in CF d have d-round fully black-box zero-knowledge proofs from one-way permutations.
Proof: Let P, V be fully black-box zero-knowledge proof based on one-way permutations. Applying the weak duality lemma, we obtain a protocol P , V that is public-coin protocol where the prover, verifier and the simulator have access to Sam We remark that if NP ⊆ CF O(1) , then the corollary is tight; Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [10] present a fully black-box construction of an ω(1)-round protocol for NP based on one-way functions. On the other hand, Goldreich and Kahan [7] , present a fully black-box O(1)-round zero-knowledge proofs for all of NP using claw-free permutations.
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Remark 4. A very recent work by Gordon, Wee, Xiao and Yerukhimovich [12] strengthens Corollary 2 by removing the usage of the random oracle π, and thus placing the class of languages having O(1)-round fully black-box zero-knowledge proofs from one-way permutations in CF' O(1) (see Section 3.2). By relying on the recent work of [16] , they obtain as a corollary that only languages in coAM have constant-round fully black-box zero-knowledge proofs from one-way permutations where the black-box simulator only makes a "constant number of adaptive queries" (where adaptive queries are defined in an appropriate way).
Using the strong-duality transformation, we obtain an analogous result for zero-knowledge arguments as well. Proof: Applying the strong-duality lemma, there exists a protocol P , V , that is public-coin protocol where the prover, verifier and the simulator have access to Sam π o( n log n ) that is (π, Sam π o( n log n ) )-relativized black-box zero-knowledge argument. Thus, using Theorem 4, we have that L ∈ CF o( n log n ) . If NP ⊆ CF o( n log n ) , then the corollary is essentially tight. Feige and Shamir [5] and Pass and Wee [22] present an O(1)-round zero-knowledge arguments based on one-way functions. While, the former construction relies on one-way functions in a non black-box way, the latter is a fully black-box construction. Nevertheless, both the constructions require superlinear verifier communication complexity. On the other hand, efficient zero-knowledge arguments due to Kilian [17] have poly-logarithmic communication complexity, but are fully black-box based only on collision-resistant hash functions. 1 Goldreich-Kahan use claw-free permutations to construct constant-round statistically-hiding commitments. However, these can be constructed under the potentially weaker assumption of collision-resistant hash functions [3, 15] . Therefore, there also exists constant-round black-box zero-knowledge proofs for all of NP based on collision-resistant hash functions.
Lower Bounds for Concurrent Zero Knowledge
The notion of concurrent zero-knowledge introduced by Dwork, Naor and Sahai [4] , considers the execution of zero-knowledge in a concurrent setting. That is, a single adversary participates as a verifier in many concurrent executions (see [23] for a formal definition and discussion). Analogous strong and weak duality transformation for concurrent zero-knowledge proofs and arguments follow directly by the proof of Lemma 1 and 2. We now turn to prove our lower bounds. Recently, Pass, Tseng and Wikström in [21] prove that only languages in BPP have public-coin black-box concurrent zero-knowledge proofs or arguments. As the result of Goldreich-Krawczyk [8] , this proof uses the simulator as a black-box to decide the language L, and relativizes. We therefore have:
Theorem 5 (Implicit in [21] ). Let P
• be a O-relativized public-coin concurrent zero-knowledge proof (or argument) for a language L with a black-box simulator S (and negligible soundness error). Then, there exists a PPT machine M
O decides L with probability 2 3 when the probability is taken over a uniformly chosen O ∈ O and the internal coin tosses of M .
As corollary of the strong and weak duality transformation for concurrent zeroknowledge, we obtain the following.
Corollary 4 A language L has a o( n log n )-round fully black-box concurrent zeroknowledge proof (or argument with o(n) verifier communication complexity) based on one-way permutations, then L ∈ CF o( n log n ) . This result is tight if NP ⊆ CF o( n log n ) ; Prabhakaran, Rosen and Sahai [20] provide a fully black-box constructions of ω(log n)-round concurrent zero-knowledge proofs, or arguments with polylogarithmic communication complexity, based on collision-resistant hash functions; Pass and Wee [22] provide an O(n)-round fully black-box argument based on one-way functions.
